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CASE COMMENTS
DUTY TO DISCLOSE INSIDE INFORMATION ARISES FROM A
FIDUCIARY OR SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PARTIES
TO A SECURITIES TRANSACTION
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980)
In Chiarella v. United States' the Supreme Court limited the applica-
bility of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19342 and SEC
rule lOb-5 3 by holding that an affirmative duty to disclose material
nonpublic information arises from the existence of a special relation-
ship4 between the buyer and seller of the securities.5
Defendant, an employee of a company engaged in printing corporate
takeover bids, deduced from coded documents the identity of corpora-
tions targeted for takeover by the printing company's customers.6
Without disclosing this information, defendant purchased stock in the
target companies and profitably sold the shares immediately after the
. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1976) provides as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national
securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered
on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors.
3. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1980) provides as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national
securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security.
4. For further discussion of the term "special relationship," see notes 18, 33, 38-43, 50 infra
and accompanying text.
5 445 U.S. at 233, 235.
6. Id. at 224.
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takeover attempts became public.7 Affirming the trial court8 verdict
convicting Chiarella of violating section 10(b) and rule 10b-5, 9 the Sec-
ond Circuit Court of Appeals' ° found that Chiarella breached an af-
firmative duty to disclose nonpublic information obtained by his
regular access to market information." The United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari, 12 reversed, 13 and held Failure to disclose ma-
terial 14 nonpublic 5 information in a securities transaction results in vi-
olation of section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 when a preexisting relationship
between the parties gives rise to an affirmative duty to disclose the in-
formation. 16
Traditionally, failure to disclose material information in a business
7. Id. "Of the five transactions, four involved tender offers and one concerned a merger."
Id. at 224 n.1 (citing United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1363 n.2 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 445
U.S. 222 (1980)).
8. United States v. Chiarella, 450 F. Supp. 95 (S.D.N.Y.), aj'd, 588 F.2d 1358 (2d Cir.
1978), rev'd, 445 U.S. 222 (1980). Prior to the trial court action, Chiarella entered a consent decree
with the Securities and Exchange Commission in which he agreed to return his profits to the
sellers of the shares of stock. See SEC v. Chiarella, No. 77 Civ. 2534 (GLG) (S.D.N.Y. May 24,
1977).
9. Most cases and commentators refer to both § 10(b) and rule lob-5 when analyzing ma-
nipulative or deceptive actions in the securities market. See, e.g., List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340
F.2d 457, 459 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965); Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F.
Supp. 808, 828-29 (D. Del. 1951), af'd, 235 F.2d 369 (3d Cir. 1956); Fleischer, Mundheim, &
Murphy, An Initial Inquiry Into the Responsibilit to Disdose Market Information, 121 U. PA. L.
REv. 798, 798 (1973); 10 SETON HALL L. REV. 720, 721-22 (1980).
10. United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
11. Id. at 1365.
12. 441 U.S. 942 (1979).
13. 445 U.S. at 237.
14. Material information is that information to which "a reasonable man would attach im-
portance. . . in determining his choice of action in the transaction in question." SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969) (quoting
List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965)). See
Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972); Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite
Co., 396 U.S. 375, 385 (1970); Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 594 F.2d 1261, 1266 (9th Cir. 1979); Chasins
v. Smith, Barney & Co., 438 F.2d 1167, 1171 (2d Cir. 1970); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634,
642 (7th Cir. 1963); In re Blyth & Co., 43 S.E.C. 1037, 1038 n.l(a) (1969); 1 F. HARPER & J.
JAMES, TORTS 565-66 (1956). See generally Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, supra note 9, at 803;
Note, The Downstairs Insider: The Specialist and Rule 10b-5, 42 N.Y.U. L. REv. 695, 706-07
(1967).
15. The term "'[n]onpublic' refers to information that investors may not lawfully acquire
without the consent of the source." Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages
Under the FederalSecurities Laws, 93 HARv. L. REV. 322, 322 n.2 (1979). Seegenera/lyALI-ABA
COURSE OF STUDY: FRAUD, INSIDE INFORMATION, AND FIDUCIARY DUTY UNDER RULE 103-5
310-13 (Second Conference) (San Francisco) (1976).
16. 445 U.S. at 233, 235.
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transaction was actionable only when the nondisclosing party owed a
duty to the other party to disclose the information. 7 The duty to dis-
close at common law thus arose from a fiduciary or special relationship
of trust and confidence between the parties to the business transac-
tion.' 8
To restore confidence in the. financial marketplace after the stock
market crash of 1929,19 Congress enacted the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934.20 In the early stages, the scope of liability under section 10(b)
and rule 1Ob-5 of the Act was similar to that recognized at common
17. See. e.g., Oliver v. Oliver, 118 Ga. 362, 371, 45 S.E. 232, 235 (1903) (director, by virtue of
his fiduciary position, must disclose facts before purchasing shareholder's stock in same corpora-
tion); Hotchkiss v. Fisher, 136 Kan. 530, 538, 16 P.2d 531, 535 (1932) (director of a corporation,
being a fiduciary, has a duty to disclose material facts before purchasing shares from a share-
holder in the same corporation); Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 497-99, 248 N.E.2d 910,
912, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78, 83 (1969) (corporate officer breaches a duty when he sells shares without
disclosing information acquired by his position). Cf. Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419, 434 (1909)
(the special facts of the situation create the duty to disclose); Brophy v. Cities Service Co., 31 Del.
Ch. 241, 244, 70 A.2d 5, 7 (1949) (confidential secretary acquiring secret corporate information in
the course of her employment occupies a position of trust and confidence analogous to that of a
fiduciary). See generally 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1446-48 (2d ed. 1961); W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 697 (4th ed. 1971); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 551(1) (1976); Note, Purchaser's Duty to Disclose Under Securities and Exchange Commission
Rule X-lOb-5, 40 MINN. L. REV. 62, 63 (1955); Note, Rule I0b-5: Scope of Liability Extended as
Former Outsiders Become Market Insiders, 58 NEB. L. REV. 866, 872-74 (1979); Note, Civil Liabil-
itr Under Rule X-lOb-5, 42 VA. L. REV. 537, 546-47, 552-53 (1956).
18, See Farmers State Bank of Newport v. Lamon, 132 Wash. 369, 372-73, 231 P. 952, 953-54
(1925) (listing relationships when duty is imposed); note 17 supra and accompanying text. See
generally W. PROSSER, supra note 17, at 696-97.
19. See SEC v. Capital Gains Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963) (securities industry abuses
contributed to both the 1929 stock market crash and the great depression of the 1930's); Silver v.
New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 366 (1963) (the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was passed
to control abuses in the stock exchanges). See generally I L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 120-
21 (2d ed. 1961); Douglas and Bates, The Federal Securities Act of 1933, 43 YALE L.J. 171, 171
(1933); Loomis, The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Investment Advisors Act of 1940, 28
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 214, 216-17 (1959); 50 Miss. L.J. 223, 224, 224 n.ll (1979) (citing J. GAL-
BRAITH, THE GREAT CRASH (1955)). Relevant statutes passed in response to the Great Depression
include: The Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa; the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk; the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. §§ 79 to 79z-6;
the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-77bbbb; the Investment Company Act of
1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-52; and the Investment Advisors Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1
to 80b-21.
20. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a - 78kk (1977). See note 2 supra for relevant text.
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law;21 corporate officers, 22 directors 23 and controlling shareholders24 -
the traditional insiders2 5-had an affirmative duty to disclose material
21. Compare Oliver v. Oliver, 118 Ga. 362, 45 S.E. 232 (1903) (common law-action against a
director); Hotchkiss v. Fisher, 136 Kan. 530, 16 P.2d 531 (1932) (common law-action against a
director) and Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969)
(common-law action against an officer) with Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D.
Del. 1951) (rule 10b-5 action against parent corporation); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F.
Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947) (rule lOb-5 action against officers and directors) and In re Ward La
France Truck Corp., 13 S.E.C. 373 (1943) (rule lob-5 action involving officers who were also
majority shareholders). See generally Note, Rule 10b-5" Scope of Liability Extended as Former
Outsiders Become Market Insiders, 58 NEB. L. REV. 866, 877 (1979); Comment, A New Concept of
Fraud on the Securities Exchange-A Comment on In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 15 S.C. L. REv. 557,
565-66 (1963).
Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 directly addresses insider trading. 15
U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1976). Section 16(a), however, is concerned explicitly with officers, directors, and
shareholders owning over ten percent of any class of beneficial securities in a registered issuer. Id.
§ 78p(a). Rule lOb-5 was promulgated in 1942 to provide additional protection for investors. See
Exchange Act Release No. 3230 (May 21, 1942). See generally 5 A. JACOBS, THE IMPACT OF RULE
101-5 § 2, at 1-5, § 3.02(h), at 1-106 (rev. 1980).
22. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 852 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969) (officers held liable for buying shares of their corporation's stock
without disclosing their knowledge of a potential ore discovery); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.,
73 F. Supp. 798, 800 (E.D. Pa. 1947) (officers of corporation liable under rule 1ob-5 despite lack of
oral misrepresentations or half-truths); In re Ward La France Truck Co., 13 S.E.C. 373, 376-79
(1943) (officers found liable for failure to disclose material inside information before a broker-
dealer bought publicly held shares of the corporation).
23. See Pennaluna & Co. v. SEC, 410 F.2d 861, 869-70 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
1007 (1970) (broker-dealer, acting as director, liable for trading on inside information); Kohler v.
Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 638, 642 (7th Cir. 1963) (directors cannot trade on nonpublic informa-
tion gained by reason of their position); Childs v. RIC Group, Inc., 331 F. Supp. 1078, 1082-84
(N.D. Ga. 1970), a#'dper curiam, 447 F.2d 1407 (5th Cir. 1971) (director liable for purchasing
shareholder's stock without disclosing negotiations concerning resale to a third party); Kardon v.
National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798, 800 (E.D. Pa. 1947) (director of corporation liable under
rule lOb-5 despite lack of oral misrepresentations or half-truths).
24. See Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp, 808, 828-29 (D. Del, 1951) (parent corpo-
ration liable under rule lOb-5 for purchasing stock from minority shareholders without informing
them of subsidiary's true inventory value). Cf. Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462
(1977) (favorable dictum for finding liability, but Court found no violation on the facts); James
Blackstone Memorial Library Ass'n v. Gulf, M. & O.R.R., 264 F.2d 445 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
361 U.S. 815 (1959) (favorable dictum for finding liability, but court found no violation on the
facts).
25. "An insider is a person who: (1) possesses inside information, (2) knows or should know
the information is nonpublic, and (3) receives the information in his business capacity and for a
legitimate business reason by virtue of a relationship giving access, directly or indirectly, to the
information." 5 A. JACOBS, supra note 21, § 66.021a], at 3-327. The American Law Institute de-
fines insider as "a person who, by virtue of his relationship or former relationship to the issuer,
knows a fact of special significance about the issuer or the security in question that is not generally
available ... " ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 1603(b)(3), at 655 (Official Draft 1980). Inside informa-
tion is information emanating from the issuer or its insiders. FIFrH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SE-
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inside information before trading on the basis of that information.2 6
The first significant expansion of the rule lOb-5 obligation to disclose
occurred in In re Cady, Roberts & Co." In Cady, Roberts a broker-
dealer, acting on a tip from an associate in his firm, sold his clients'
shares in a corporation.28 Because the associate obtained the nonpublic
information through his inside position on the corporation's board of
directors, the Commission held that the broker-dealer violated rule
lOb-5 by failing to disclose inside information before trading on the
basis of the information. 29 The Commission reasoned that the associ-
ate's insider status and duty to disclose extended to the broker-dealer3"
as tippee.31' Although the Commission used broad language in deter-
mining the extent of the tippee's obligation to disclose,32 its decision
recognized a special relationship between the issuing company and the
CURITIES REGULATION 288-89 (Mundheim, Fleischer and Schupper, eds. 1974) (PLI Conference)
(remarks by Mr. Marty Lipton).
The courts' early definition of insider, also referred to as the traditional insider definition, was
based on the statutory restriction on corporate officers, directors, and primary stockholders, from
short-swing trading. 50 Miss. L.J. 223, 226 n.24 (1979) (construing 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1976)).
For further discussion of 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a), see note 21 supra.
26. If a person possessing nonpublic information is unable to disclose the information in
order to protect a corporate confidence, he must abstain from trading. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). Accord, Fridrich
v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307, 314 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977); Shapiro v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 236-37 (2d Cir. 1974); Radiation Dy-
namics, Inc. v. Goldmuntz, 464 F.2d 876, 887 (2d Cir. 1972).
27. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). See generally Comment, Insider Liability Under Securities Ex-
change Act Rule Iob-5: The Cady, Roberts Doctrine, 30 U. CHI. L. Rev. 121 (1962).
28. 40 S.E.C. at 912.
29. Id. at 912-13.
30. Id. at 912-15.
31. A tippee is a person who receives material nonpublic information from an insider. The
extension of rule lOb-5 liability to tippees is an extension of the officer's fiduciary duty. Tippee
liability is premised on the theory that the tippee is participating in the traditional insider's breach
of fiduciary duty. See 3 L. Loss, supra note 17, at 1450-53; Fleischer, supra note 9, at 818 n.76.
See, e.g., Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 237-38 (2d Cir.
1974); Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); In re Investors Management Co., 44
S.E.C. 633, 641 (1971).
The distinction between an insider and a tippee stems from the circumstances under which each
receives the inside information. A tippee, in contrast to an insider, either does not learn the inside
information in a business capacity, or does not have a legitimate business reason for knowing the
inside information. Despite their different means of obtaining the inside information, they both
have the same duty of disclosure. 5 A. JACOBS, supra note 21, § 66.02[a], at 3-315 to -329.
32. The Commission stated:
Analytically, the obligation [to disclose] rests on two principal elements; first, the exist-
ence of a relationship giving access, directly or indirectly, to information intended to be
available only for a corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone, and
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insider.33 The duty to disclose arose from this special relationship be-
tween the company and the insider. 4
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals further expanded rule lOb-5
liability in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,35 holding officers and em-
ployees of Texas Gulf Sulphur liable for purchasing shares of the cor-
poration's stock without disclosing their knowledge of a potential ore
discovery. 36 The extension of liability in Texas Gulf Sulphur to em-
ployees, traditionally considered not to be insiders,37 led courts to hold
broker-dealers, 38 accountants, 39 attorneys, 40 banks, 4' stock exchanges, 42
second, the inherent unfairness involved where a party takes advantage of such informa-
tion knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is dealing.
40 S.E.C. at 912 (footnotes omitted). For examples of how this test has been applied, see SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (en bane), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976
(1969); In re Investors Management Co., 44 S.E.C. 633, 640 (1971).
33. "Thus our task here is to identify those persons who are in a special relationsh@ ivith a
company and privy to its internal affairs, and thereby suffer correlative duties in trading in its
securities." 40 S.E.C. at 912 (emphasis added).
34. Id.
35. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
36. Id. at 852. Officers and employees who obtained knowledge of a potential ore discovery
by visual evaluation of the site and by drill core results had a duty to disclose this material infor-
mation to Texas Gulf Sulphur shareholders before purchasing their stock. 1d.
37. Nontraditional insiders include "[a] broad range of... persons [who] may, under appro-
priate circumstances, be deemed insiders." ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY, supra note 15, at 104.
For a list of persons who may be treated as insiders, see 5 A. JAcoBs, supra note 21, § 66.02[a], at
3-283 to 3-287; ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY, supra note 15, at 104-05; TEXAS GULF SULPHUR-
INSIDER DISCLOSURE PROBLEMS 206 (Fleischer & Flom co-chairmen) (PLI forum) (McCord &
Cohen eds.) (remarks by Mr. Alan Bromberg).
38. See Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 236-37 (2d
Cir. 1974) (broker-dealer, while engaged as a managing.underwriter for a corporation planning a
debenture offering, tipped customers to sell that corporation's stock); Wohl v. Blair, 50 F.R.D, 89,
91 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (broker-dealers used fraud to induce plaintiffs to purchase stock in a corpora-
tion) (case decided on a procedural issue); In re Blyth & Co., 43 S.E.C. 1037, 1040 (1969) (broker-
dealer traded on nonpublic information obtained from a Federal Reserve Bank employee). See
generally Jacobs, The Impact of Securities Exchange Act Rule 10b-5 on Broker-Dealers, 57 CoR-
NELL L. REv. 869 (1972).
Brokers are also subject to specific regulations in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. See 15
U.S.C. §§ 78h, 78k, 78o-I to -3 (1976).
39. See Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath and Horwath, 378 F. Supp. 112, 121-22
(S.D.N.Y. 1974) (accountants, treated as insiders of their client's corporation, incurred a duty to
disclose information about their client before shares of the client's corporation are traded based on
a materially misleading financial statement), a ff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 540
F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1976). See generally Glickman, 'Tiopee' Liability Under Section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 20 KAN. L. REV. 47, 52 (1971); Poole, Corporate
Insiders" Face More Regulation, 48 MICH. ST. B.J. 28, 39 (1963).
40. See United States v. Peltz, 433 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 955 (1971)
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and corporations43 liable under similar extensions of the breadth of
"insider" and the consequential duty to disclose. In the successful rule
10b-5 claims based on failure to disclose nonpublic information, a
nexus exists between the insider-traditional or nontraditional-and
the corporation whose securities were traded.
44
Broad language in Texas Gulf Sulphur prompted further suggestions
for judicial expansion of rule lOb-5 liability to parties trading on the
basis of undisclosed information.45 Several decisions after Texas Guf
(attorney trading on inside information obtained from SEC employee). See generally Glickman,
supra note 39, at 52; Poole, supra note 39, at 39.
41. See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 154 (1972) (liability of bank
having knowledge that its employees are acting to defraud its customers held to be co-extensive
with employees). See generally Poole, supra note 39, at 39. For further discussion of Affiliated Ute
Citizens, see text accompanying notes 53-58 infra.
42. See Carr v. New York Stock Exch., Inc., 414 F. Supp. 1292, 1300 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (dic-
tum) (a stock exchange could be liable if it fails to inform investors in a member firm of material
information concerning that firm's financial and operating condition).
43. See Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787, 796 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970) (an acquiring corporation is an insider of a target company when
secret communications are made between the acquiring corporation and the management of the
target company); Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 417 F.2d 147, 154-55 (7th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970) (corporation liable under rule lob-5 for failing to disclose
to purchasers that securities dealer was making false statements about the corporation); SEC v.
Great Am. Indus., Inc., 407 F.2d 453, 458-59 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 920 (1969)
(corporation and its officers enjoined for rule lob-5 violations).
44. Lewelling v. First Calif. Co., 564 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1977) (brokerage firm owes duty to
purchaser of stock); Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 239
(2d Cir. 1974) (broker-dealer owes a duty to the corporation for which it is involved as under-
writer); Pennaluna & Co. v. SEC, 410 F.2d 861, 869-70 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1007
(1970) (broker-dealer has same duties as a traditional insider). Cf. Zweig v. Hearst, Corp., 594
F.2d 1261, 1271 (9th Cir. 1979) (financial columnist owes duty to the general public); Herzfeld v.
Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath and Horwath, 378 F. Supp. 112, 121-22 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (account-
ants owe a duty to the investors because the investors rely on their statements). See generally
Note, Rule 10b-5: Scope of Liability Extended as Former Outsiders Become Market Insiders, 58
NEB. L. REv. 866, 879 (1979).
45. An example of the broad language in Texas Gulf Sulphur is the following:
fMlnyone in possession of material inside information must either disclose it to the in-
vesting public, or, if he is disabled from disclosing it in order to protect a corporate
confidence, or he chooses not to do so, must abstain from trading in or recommending
the securities concerned while such information remains undisclosed.
401 F.2d at 848 (emphasis added).
For cases following this broad formulation, see, e.g., Strong v. France, 474 F.2d 747, 752 (9th
Cir. 1973); Radiation Dynamics, Inc. v. Goldmuntz, 464 F.2d 876, 887 (2d Cir. 1972); Jefferies &
Co. v. Arkus-Duntov, 357 F. Supp. 1206, 1214 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). Cf. SEC v. Great Am. Indus.,
Inc., 407 F.2d 453, 462-63 (2d Cir. 1968) (Kaufman, J., concurring), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 920
(1969) (a willingness expressed to find liability under rule lob-5 regardless of whether the defend-
ant had a fiduciary or special relationship with the corporation whose shares were traded).
For arguments that rule lob-5 can and should be expanded, see Comment, The Application of
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Suophur, however, significantly limited the broad implications of that
decision. 6 In General Time Corp. v. Talley Industries47 the court re-
fused to find liability under rule lOb-5 absent a prior fiduciary relation-
ship between a tender offeror and issuer.48 The Second Circuit in SEC
v. Great American Industries49 stated that to place the duty of disclosure
on a party not occupying a special relationship to a seller or buyer of
securities would be a novel interpretation of rule lOb-5.5 0
The Supreme Court expanded the special relationship concept in ,4f-
filiated Ute Citizens v. United States.5' Defendant bankers functioned
both as transfer agents52 for a group of Indians and as market makers
5 3
Rule 10b-5 to "Market Insiders", 92 HARv. L. REv. 1538, 1543-44 (1979); 1980 Wis. L. REV. 162,
184-88. See also Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under the Federal
Securities Laws, 93 HARv. L. REv. 322, 353-67 (1979); Keeton, Fraud-Concealment and Non-
disclosure, 15 TEx. L. REV. 1, 25-26 (1936).
For an analysis contending that expansion of rule lOb-5 is supported by the legislative history of
the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1976), and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976), see 1980 Wis. L. REV. 162, 178-81. For arguments reaching the
opposite conclusion, see Memorandum Amicus Curiae of the Securities Industry Association at
22-23, Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980); Brief for the Petitioner at 16 n.5, Chiarella
v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980). Accord, 5 A. JACOBS, supra note 21, at § 6.03.
46. See notes 47-50 infra and accompanying text.
47. 403 F.2d 159 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1026 (1969).
48. Id. at 161-64. In General Time the issuer's shareholders who sold before disclosure of the
merger plans did so at a lower pfice than if the merger plans had been made public. Nevertheless,
the court stated that they knew of no rule of law requiring a purchaser of stock, who is not an
insider and has no fiduciary relationship to a prospective seller, to reveal circumstances that might
raise a seller's demands and thus abort the sale. Id. at 164.
Later, in Frigitemp v. Financial Dynamics Fund, 524 F.2d 275 (2d Cir. 1975), a purchaser
corporation did not disclose to an issuer that while it was purchasing the issuer's debenture, it was
also purchasing the issuer's over-the-counter stock. The court held that the corporation had no
duty to disclose its intent to purchase the issuer's over-the-counter stock by virtue of its being a
purchaser. Id. at 278-79.
49. 407 F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), ceri. denied, 395 U.S. 920 (1969).
50. Id. at 460.
51. 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
52. "A transfer agent keeps a record of the name of each registered shareowner, his or her
address, the number of shares owned, and sees that certificates presented to his office for transfer
are properly cancelled and new certificates issued in the name of the transferee." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1342 (5th ed. 1979). In Affiliated Ute Citizens the defendant bank held all the certifi-
cates and issued receipts to the shareholders. 406 U.S. at 136-37.
53. The SEC defines a market maker as:
[A] dealer who, with respect to a particular security, holds himself out (by entering
indications of interest in purchasing and selling in an inter-dealer quotations system or
otherwise) as being willing to buy and sell for his own account on a continuous basis
otherwise than on a national securities exchange.
SEC Rule 17A-9(f)(l), 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-(9)(f) (1980). A market maker is usually a broker-
dealer. See, e.g., Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co., 438 F.2d 1167, 1170 (2d Cir. 1970); In re Blythe
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for the Indians' tribal assets, which were being distributed as stock cer-
tificates.54 The bankers purchased stock from the Indians without dis-
closing that the stock could be sold at a higher price in another
market." The Court found a duty to disclose arising from the special
relationship between the bankers, as transfer agents and market mak-
ers, and the Indians.56
Following Affiliated Ute Citizens, the United States Supreme Court
limited the scope of rule 1Ob-5, holding that the rule does not provide a
cause of action when a complaint does not allege deception or manipu-
lation,57 when a claim is for negligence,58 or when the complainant is
not a buyer or seller of securities.59
In Chiarella v. United States6" the United States Supreme Court as-
serted that failure to disclose nonpublic market information before
buying or selling securities is not fraud under section 10(b) unless the
person using the information has a duty to disclose the information
before trading.6" The significance of the opinion, however, lies in the
majority's declaration that a duty to disclose arises when "one party to
a transaction has information that the other party is entitled to know
because of a fiduciary or similar relation of trust and confidence be-
tween them."62
Justice Powell, writing for the majority, analyzed the language of
section 10(b) and its legislative history,6 3 and concluded that neither
source provides guidance for determining when nondisclosure of non-
public information constitutes a violation of section 10(b) or rule lOb-
5.64 Turning to case law, Justice Powell analyzed Cady, Roberts,65
& Co., 43 S.E.C. 1037 (1969). A financial columnist who bought stocks before recommending
them has also been held a market maker. Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 594 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1979).
54. 406 U.S. at 152.
55. Id. at 153.
56. Id. at 152-53. One interpretation of this case is that the special relationship requiring a
duty to disclose arose from the Indians' trust and confidence in the bankers. Fleischer, Mund-
heim, & Murphy, supra note 9, at 820.
57. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473-74 (1977).
58. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 200 (1976).
59. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 735-36 (1975).
60. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
61. Id. at 231.
62. Id. at 228 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(a)(a) (1976)).
63. 445 U.S. at 225-26.
64. 445 U.S. at 226. But see note 45 supra.
65. Id. at 226-28. See notes 27-34 supra and accompanying text.
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Texas Gulf Sulphur,6 6 and Affiliated Ute Citizens67 and found that an
affirmative duty to disclose under section 10(b) arises only when a spe-
cial relationship between the transacting parties exists.68 Absent a spe-
cial relationship between the party possessing the nonpublic
information and the issuer, there is no duty to disclose.6 9
Justice Powell rejected the regular access to market test,70 which im-
posed lOb-5 liability on anyone trading before disclosing nonpublic in-
formation obtained because of regular access to the information. 7' He
reasoned that liability based on regular access to market information is
incorrect because financial unfairness is not necessarily fraud under
section 10(b) and because the element required to make silence fraud-
66. 445 U.S. at 229. See notes 35-36, 45 supra and accompanying text.
67. 445 U.S. at 229-30. See notes 51-56 supra and accompanying text.
68. 445 U.S. at 227-28, 230.
69. Id. at 229 (citing General Time Corp. v. Talley Indus., 403 F.2d 159, 164 (2d Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1026 (1969)). For further discussion of General Time, see notes 47-48 supra
and accompanying text.
70. 445 U.S. at 232-33. The regular access to market information test declares that "any-
one--corporate insider or not-who regularly receives material nonpublic information may not
use that information to trade in securities without incurring an affirmative duty to disclose."
United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1365 (2d Cir. 1978) (emphasis in original), rev'd, 445
U.S. 222 (1980).
71. 445 U.S. at 232-33. Justice Powell was concerned with whether rule lob-5 can be inter-
preted to impose a policy of parity of information. He concluded that a policy of parity cannot be
derived from rule lOb-5, and thus did not reach the issue of whether parity should be imposed.
For arguments that parity should be imposed, see FIFrH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES
REGULATION 294-304 (Mundheim, Fleischer and Schupper, eds. 1974) (PLI conference); Schot-
land, Unsafe at Any Price. 4 Reply to Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock Market, 53 VA. L.
REV. 1425 (1967). See also *hite Paper on Company Law Reform, Cmnd. No. 5391 at 8 (July,
1973) (printed in VII REPORTS, ACCOUNTS AND PAPERS (1972-1973)) (England) (quoted in Mund-
heim, supra, at 295). For arguments reaching the opposite conclusion, see H. MANNE, INSIDER
TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET 138-41 (1966); Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, supra note 9,
at 816; Manne, Insider Trading and the Law Professors, 23 VAND. L. REV. 547 (1970); ABA Com-
ment Letter on Material, Non-Public Information (printed in SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) D-1, D-
2, D-6, no. 233, January 2, 1974); P. Loomis, Some Reflections on Rule lob-5 and Market Infor-
mation 12-13 (Remarks before Second Annual ALI-ABA Course of Study, San Francisco, May 6,
1976) (on file with the WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY) (cited in Brudney, supra
note 15, at 340 n.63).
California has resolved the "should" question of parity in the securities market by enacting a
state statute requiring equal access to information. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 25402 (Deering 1979).
Adoption of an equal access test also raises due process questions. See Deutch, The New Deal
and the Burger Court: The Significance of United States v. Chiarella, 57 TEX. L. REV. 965 (1979);
Comment, Due Process: Notice Requirements Under Rule 10b-5, 79 ARIz. ST. L.J. 651 (1979);
Comment, Rule JOb-. Birth of the Concept of Market Insider and Its Application in a Criminal
Case, 8 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 467, 477 (1980); Nat'l L.J., May 26, 1980, at 27, col. 1.
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a duty to disclose-was not present in this transaction.72
Responding to the Government's argument that Chiarella breached
a duty to the acquiring corporation, Justice Powell found that the issue
was not submitted to the jury and, therefore, was not properly before
the Court.73  Justice Stevens, concurring, emphasized that the Court
was not ruling on whether Chiarella owed a duty to the acquiring cor-
poration.7 4
Justice Brennan, concurring separately, and Chief Justice Burger,
dissenting, rejected the theory that a duty to disclose under section
10(b) arises from the mere possession of nonpublic information.75 The
Chief Justice elucidated a misappropriation theory that imposes liabil-
ity on persons who trade securities based on illegally obtained informa-
tion.76
Justice Blackmun, in a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Marshall,
advocated extension of liability under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 to
persons exploiting a structural informational advantage by trading in
affected securities. 77 Relying on broad language in the legislative his-
tory and earlier cases interpreting rule lOb-5, 78 Justice Blackmun con-
cluded that rule lOb-5 mandates liability for persons trading securities
72. 445 U.S. at 232-33.
73. Id. at 236.
74. Id. at 238 (Stevens, J., concurring).
75. Id. at 238-39 (Brennan, J., concurring), id. at 240 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Although
Justice Brennan and Chief Justice Burger interpreted the jury instructions differently, id. at 239
(Brennan, J., concurring), id. at 243-45 (Burger, C.J., dissenting), Justice Brennan accepted the
Chief Justice's misappropriation theory. Id. at 239 (Brennan, J., concurring). For discussion of
the misappropriation theory, see note 76 infra and accompanying text.
76. Id. at 239-43 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Because only the Chief Justice considered the
misappropriation theory to have been given to the jury, see note 75 supra, that theory did not
become a major concern in the case. The Court, Chief Justice Burger explained, did not reject the
misappropriation theory; it simply did not address it because it had not been given to the jury.
Chief Justice Burger does not believe that the misappropriation theory is necessarily incompatible
with the majority's holding. 445 U.S. at 243 n.4 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
Justice Powell, however, noted the related problems that would arise if the misappropriation
theory had become a significant issue in this case. Id. at 237 n.21.
77. Id. at 251-52 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
78. Justice Blackmun noted that Congress recognized a purpose "to assure that dealing in
securities is fair and without undue preferences or advantages among investors." Id. at 248
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting H.R. CONF. REP. No. 94-229, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 91, re-
printedin [19751 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 323).
Justice Blackmun also stated that "by repeated use of the word 'any,' " the statute and rule "are
obviously meant to be inclusive." 445 U.S. at 250 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Affiliated
Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972)).
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without disclosing confidential information not available to others.79
The majority's refusal to extend rule lOb-5 liability absent a relation-
ship of trust and confidence is commendable. Liability for nondis-
closure under rule lob-5 is premised on the existence of such a
relationship between the transacting parties. 80 Silence is fraud under
the rule only when an affirmative duty to disclose exists.8" Because the
duty to disclose arises within the context of a fiduciary relationship be-
tween the transacting parties, 2 Chiarella does not reduce the efficacy of
rule lOb-5's demands on traditional and nontraditional insiders who
trade with persons to whom they owe a duty.
By refusing to construe rule lOb-5 broadly, the Court refused to
adopt a policy of equal access to information.8 3 Finding liability for
nondisclosure without requiring a special relationship between the in-
sider and the corporation whose shares are traded would be a radical
departure from established law.84 Discarding the nexus requirement is
tantamount to declaring a policy of equal access to information.8" Be-
cause the legislative history provides no explicit support for such a
change in policy,86 the Court properly refused to adopt the equal access
to information standard.
Justice Blackmun's dissent is unpersuasive. Broad language from the
legislative history and earlier case law87 provide a weak basis for con-
cluding that Congress desired rule lOb-5 to require equal access to in-
formation. He ignores the Williams Act88 and warehousing 8 -- two
79. 445 U.S. at 251-52 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
80. See notes 38-44, 48, 50 supra and accompanying text.
81. See note 61 supra.
82. See notes 38-44, 48-50, 51-62, 68 supra and accompanying text.
83. See notes 70-71 supra and accompanying text.
84. See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
85. See note 70 supra and accompanying text.
86. See note 45 supra. Although the legislative history provides no explicit support for such
a change in policy, it is arguable that the legislative history reveals that a policy of parity is not
within the lawmakers' expectations. This contention gets its strongest support from the Williams
Act and "warehousing." See 445 U.S. at 233.
The Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(l) (1976), permits a tender offeror to purchase up to five
percent of the target company's stock prior to disclosure of its plans for acquisition.
"Warehousing" takes place when a corporation gives advance notice to institutional investors of
its intention to launch a tender offer. These investors are then able to purchase stock in the target
company before the tender offer is made public and the price of the shares rises. See 445 U.S. at
234 (citing Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, supra note 9, at 811-12).
87. See note 78 supra and accompanying text.
88. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(l) (1976). See note 86 supra.
89. See note 86 supra.
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examples in which Congress and the Commission expressly allowed
persons to trade securities with unequal access to information. Inter-
preting legislative intent by focusing on vague language in the legisla-
tive history and ignoring express evidence results in a substitution of
the Court's view for that of the legislature. The Court is not at liberty
to make such a substitution.9"
Chiarella provides clear guidelines for the lower courts. Criminal
liability under rule lOb-5 results when a person failing to disclose infor-
mation owes a duty to disclose that information to the other party in
the transaction. 9' Courts will impose a duty of disclosure when "a
fiduciary or similar relation of trust and confidence exists between [the
transacting parties]."9
Several rule lOb-5 issues are left open to speculation after Chiarella.
The role of the misappropriation theory in future situations similar to
Chiarella is unclear.93 Further, rule 14e-3,94 promulgated after the
Court's decision in Chiarella to fill the nondisclosure gap created by
that decision, demands disclosure in future Chiarella-type situations.
The Court in Chiarella clarified actionable nondisclosure under sec-
tion 10(b) and rule lOb-5. Liability for nondisclosure is based on a
duty to disclose that arises from a fiduciary or special relation between
the transacting parties. Liability for nondisclosure thus cannot be
based solely on a claim that a person bought or sold securities while
possessing unequal access to information.95
90. In a recent case interpreting rule lOb-5 the Supreme Court stated that federal courts are
"not at liberty to legislate" a different result from the one Congress has ordained. Touche Ross &
Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 579 (1979). Cf. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,482 (1965)
(the Court does not sit as a superlegislature). See generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG,
HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 404-10 (1978).
91. See note I 1 supra and accompanying text.
92. See note 62 supra and accompanying text.
93. See note 76 supra and accompanying text.
94. 45 Fed. Reg. 60,410, 60,411 (Sept. 12, 1980) (to be codified in 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3).
95. See notes 70-71, 83-86 supra and accompanying text. It is interesting to note that the
American Law Institute's proposed federal securities code, recently endorsed by the SEC, see
Legal Times of Washington, Sept. 22, 1980, at 1, 8, col. 1, does not include a requirement of equal
access to information. See ALI FED. SEc. CODE § 1603(a) (Proposed Official Draft 1978).
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